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Shipp et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Convention). The Court enforces the obligations entered into by the Council of
Europe’s Contracting States and is composed of a number of judges equal to the
number of Contracting States. Any
Contracting State or individual may allege
violations of the Convention by filing a
complaint with the Court. In its decisions
the Court acknowledges the Contracting
States’ various legal systems.
The Court is divided into four Sections.
Article 27 of the Convention provides that
each of the four Sections shall consist of a committee of three judges, a Chamber of seven
judges, and a Grand Chamber of seventeen
judges. After a case is assigned to a particular
Section, a rapporteur will examine the case and
assign it to either a three-member committee
or a Chamber. A committee can decide with a
unanimous vote to dismiss a complaint.
Individual complaints that are not dismissed
are referred to a Chamber, which then determines the merits of the case.
Under Article 43 of the Convention, any
party to a case may request an appeal to a
Grand Chamber within three months of a
Chamber judgment. A Grand Chamber will
accept such requests if, after review by a
panel of five judges, the request raises a serious issue of general importance or concerns
the interpretation or application of the
Convention. When a Grand Chamber
admits a complaint, no judge that has heard
the arguments in Chamber will participate
in the Grand Chamber hearing except the
President of the Chamber that previously
heard the case and the judge from the
defending state, who sits in the Grand
Chamber as a formality. A Grand Chamber
rarely admits complaints. Grand Chambers
delivered only 12 of the Court’s 703 judgments in 2003, and 16 of the Court’s 718
judgments in 2004.

LEYLA

AHIN V.

TURKEY

Leyla ahin, a Turkish national from a
traditional Muslim family, believes that she

has a religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf (türban). Ms. ahin enrolled in the
Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University
on August 26, 1997, after completing four
years of study at Bursa University, during
which time she regularly wore a türban. On
February 23, 1998, the university’s Vice
Chancellor issued a circular to staff and faculty that prohibited students from wearing
the türban in lectures, courses, and tutorials.
This circular required university faculty and
staff to enforce the new regulations and outlined the disciplinary measures that would
be taken against students who violated the
regulations. Consequently, in March, April,
and June 1998 the university’s staff and faculty denied Ms. ahin admission to written
exams, enrollment in courses, and admission
to lectures because she was wearing a türban.
In May 1998 the Dean of the university
issued Ms. ahin a warning for violating the
rules on dress.
Ms. ahin applied to the Istanbul
Administrative Court (Administrative
Court) on July 29, 1998, and requested that
the court void the circular. She claimed
infringements of Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
She alleged that the circular lacked a statutory basis and that the Vice-Chancellor’s office
had no power to regulate student dress in
institutions of higher learning. The Istanbul
Administrative Court held that the university had the power to regulate student dress to
maintain order and dismissed her complaint. Her appeal was similarly dismissed.
On April 13, 1999, the university suspended Ms. ahin from the Faculty of
Medicine for one semester because she violated the dress code and participated in a student demonstration against the new regulation. The university also brought proceedings
against other students for participating in the
demonstration. Ms. ahin applied again to
the Adminstrative Court to invalidate the
university’s actions. The Administrative
Court denied her request on the grounds that
settled case law demonstrated that the university was acting within its regulatory power
to maintain order on the university’s campus.
On September 16, 1999, Ms. ahin abandoned her studies at Istanbul University and
enrolled in Vienna University.
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Ms. ahin lodged a complaint with the
European Commission of Human Rights
(Commission) on July 21, 1998. She alleged
that the university’s regulations banning the
türban violated her rights under Articles 8,
9, 10, and 14 of the Convention, and Article
2 of Protocol No. 1. Article 8 protects the
right to respect for private and family life;
Article 9 ensures freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; Article 10 preserves
freedom of expression; Article 14 prohibits
discrimination; and Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 establishes the right to education. In
the Chamber and subsequent Grand
Chamber judgments, the Court held that
Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
were dispositive of the case and focused on
those Articles in both its opinions.
A Chamber judgment was delivered on
June 29, 2004. The Chamber held unanimously that the regulations impaired the
applicant’s right to manifest her religion but
concluded that these limitations were legitimate. Article 9, section 2 permits limitations
on freedom to manifest one’s religion that are
prescribed by law and necessary to a democratic society in the interests of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. The Chamber
concluded that there were no separate violations under the other Articles. On September
ahin appealed the
27, 2004, Ms.
Chamber’s decision and requested a Grand
Chamber hearing.
On November 10, 2005, the Grand
Chamber delivered its judgment on Ms.
ahin’s appeal. The Grand Chamber discussed the political history and evolution of
the Turkish state, the manner in which
Turkish courts and legislators developed regulations on the wearing of the türban, and
the variations among European states in regulating manifestations of religious belief and
practice in educational institutions.
Turkey has an established history of regulating religious attire in public and
women’s dress in particular. Public dress
codes during the two decades following the
proclamation of the Turkish Republic in
October 1923 sought to promote gender
equality under the law and to establish secularism. The Grand Chamber noted that the
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Turkish state’s regulations on the wearing of
the türban were an outgrowth of its evolution as a symbol of Islam in Turkey’s modern
political landscape. The Turkish Supreme
Administrative Court relied on this assumption when it rendered a judgment in
December 1984 that recognized limitations
on the wearing of the türban in educational
institutions as lawful.
The Turkish Constitutional Court
(Constitutional Court) has similarly justified
the regulations on the wearing of the türban
under the Turkish Republic’s constitutional
guarantees of gender equality and secularism.
The Constitutional Court has held that the
principles of the Turkish Republic and the
Constitution guarantee the individual right
to choose whether to follow a particular religion, and that permitting the türban in educational institutions amounts to government
endorsement of Islam because the educational institutions at issue are state universities.
The Constitutional Court has also recognized that the türban is both a religious garment and a political statement. Therefore,
the freedom to manifest one’s religion can be
restricted on public order grounds to defend
the constitutional principle of secularism.
The Grand Chamber agreed with this
assessment and found that the regulations
implemented at Istanbul University were
within the bounds of the Constitutional
Court’s rulings. It considered the regulations
on the türban, or the absence thereof, in each
Contracting State, and noted that Azerbaijan
and Albania are the only other Contracting
States that regulate the wearing of the türban
at the university level. The Grand Chamber
also recognized the political overtones that the
türban could introduce at the university or
secondary school setting. The Court thus
adopted a relativistic approach to the issue of
whether the limitation on the türban in
Turkey was justified under Article 9, section 2.
At issue before the Court was whether
Turkey had exercised proper discretion in
determining the extent or the existence of
competing interests in the regulations of the
wearing of the türban at the university level.
Interestingly, the Court’s Grand Chamber
judgment did not address critically whether
the wearing of the türban encouraged disorderly conduct. Although it noted that one of
the justifications for the restriction at
Istanbul University was the potential for the
türban to interfere with a physician’s ability
to engage safely in laboratory work, this justification was not the crux of the Turkish

Constitutional Court’s ruling, which
invoked fear of public disorder as the general basis for such restrictions.
A substantial 12-page dissenting opinion
by one of the Court’s female judges, Judge
Tulkens (Belgium), followed the Grand
Chamber’s decision. Her dissent expressed dislike for the majority’s wide “margin of appreciation” accorded to Contracting States in discharging their obligations under the
Convention. According to Judge Tulkens, the
majority opinion would allow states substantial
discretion in conforming to Convention obligations. As apparent justification for this
degree of discretion, the majority opinion
noted a lack of consensus among Contracting
States regarding the regulation of religious
dress in public educational institutions. The
majority opinion also noted that national
courts and administrative organs have better
access to public sentiment and information on
these issues. Judge Tulkens doubted that a lack
of consensus among European states should
cause the Court to eschew its duty to supervise
Contracting States’ efforts to conform to
Convention standards.
Judge Tulkens also felt that the Court had
not properly demonstrated that Turkish secularism and public order had been threatened by
permitting the wearing of the türban at Istanbul
University. The only instance of public disorder
referred to by the Court was a student demonstration at Istanbul University that was organized to avert the adoption of the regulation
banning the türban. Clearly, the regulation
itself caused the disorder and not the wearing of
the türban. The Court did not describe specific
circumstances that would necessitate such regulations on public order grounds at Istanbul
University. Rather, it deferred to the Turkish
authorities to decide.

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
EDITOR’S NOTE: Please see David Baluarte’s
article, “Inter-American Justice Comes to the
Dominican Republic: An Island Shakes as
Human Rights and Sovereignty Clash,” on
page 25 for an analysis of another important
decision by the Inter-American Court, Yean
and Bosico v. Dominican Republic.
The Inter-American Human Rights
System was created with the adoption of the
American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (Declaration) in 1948. In
1959 the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) was established as an independent organ of the
Organization of American States (OAS), and
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it held its first session one year later. In 1969
the American Convention on Human
Rights (Convention) was adopted. The
Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court). According to the Convention, once
the Commission determines a case is admissible and meritorious, it will make recommendations and, in some cases, present the
case to the Inter-American Court for adjudication. The Inter-American Court hears
these cases, determines liability under relevant regional treaties and agreements, and
assesses and awards damages and other
forms of reparations to victims of human
rights violations.
During its most recent session, in
Mapiripán v. Colombia, the Inter-American
Court set a new precedent by rejecting
domestic rules of impunity and reiterating
its jurisdiction and body of law as controlling over the laws of OAS member states.

MAPIRIPÁN V. COLOMBIA
On September 5, 2003, the Commission
filed the case Massacre of Mapiripán
(Masacre de Mapiripán) before the InterAmerican Court, which alleged Colombia’s
violation of Article 4 (Right to Life), Article
5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 7
(Right to Personal Liberty), Article 8 (Right
to a Fair Trial), and Article 25 (Right to
Judicial Protection) of the Convention. The
Commission and non-governmental organizations, including Corporación Colectivo de
Abogados “José Alvear Restrepo” and the
Center for International Justice and Law,
represented the victims’ families. They
alleged that from July 15 - July 20, 1997,
state agents and approximately 100 members of the Colombian Units of Self-Defense
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) kidnapped, tortured, and murdered at least 49
civilians and threw their bodies in the
Guaviare River in Mapiripán.
On March 7, 2005, the Inter-American
Court held a public audience, where representatives of the Commission, the victims’
families, and representatives of Colombia
presented their arguments. Although
Colombia initially argued that the victims
had not exhausted their domestic legal remedies, it later implicitly accepted the InterAmerican Court’s jurisdiction and recognized its violations of Articles 4, 5, and 7 of
the Convention. On September 15, 2005, at
the most recent sentencing hearing, the
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Inter-American Court again examined, evaluated, and admitted the testimony of the
victims’ relatives, human rights lawyers, a
psychologist, and an attorney from the
Colombian Supreme Court.
After examining this evidence, the
Inter-American Court recognized the following acts as true: (1) that the Colombian
armed conflict and illegal armed groups
called paramilitaries (paramilitares) existed,
(2) that in its effort to combat guerrilla
groups, Colombia created self-defense
groups whose goal was to aid the armed
forces in anti-subversive operations and to
defend themselves from guerrillas, (3) that
in the 1980s the self-defense groups shifted their objectives and became paramilitares, which negatively influenced the stability, social order, and public peace of the
country, (4) that Colombia issued laws
such as Decree 128, which established
socio-economic and other benefits for
armed organizations that had begun to
demobilize, (5) that relationships existed
between paramilitares and members of the
armed forces, (6) that paramilitares, drugtrafficking organizations, and the Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC)
tried to control the Municipality of
Mapiripán, (7) that members of the armed
forces believed that many Mapiripán residents were involved in subversive acts and
were members of the FARC, (8) that the
Colombian Army facilitated the transportation of 100 members of the selfdefense groups on July 12, 1997, (9) that
these members tortured and dismembered
individuals they believed worked for or
sympathized with the FARC on July 15,
1997, (10) that the paramilitary incursion
in Mapiripán was an act that was carefully
planned by the Colombian armed forces,
and (11) that Colombia failed to completely and efficiently investigate these acts
and denied the victims’ families access to
the courts.
Despite Colombia’s argument that state
agents acting in their individual capacities
directed the Mapiripán massacre, the InterAmerican Court concluded that Colombia
was responsible for this series of violations.
The Inter-American Court based its conclusions on the state’s failure to detain the paramilitares after state agents facilitated their
aerial
and
ground
transportation.
Additionally, the Inter-American Court
noted that members of the Colombian
Army carefully planned and executed the

massacre, and that the state failed to protect
the residents of Mapiripán from July 15 July 20, 1997.
At its most recent session, the InterAmerican Court considered and condemned two additional violations: violations of the rights of children and violations of the right to the freedom of movement and residence. The Inter-American
Court noted the possible brutality endured
by minors during the Mapiripán massacre
because many of them were murdered, displaced, orphaned, and/or subjected to
physical and psychological pain. As a result
of this brutality, the Inter-American Court
requested that Colombia verify the ages of
the victims to accurately determine the
number of minors affected by the massacre.
In this respect, Colombia may also have
violated Article 19 of the Convention
(Rights of the Child), which affords special
“measures of protection required … as a
minor on the part of the family, society,
and the state.” In addition, the InterAmerican Court suggested Colombia may
have violated Articles 38 and 39 of the
Convention of the Rights of the Child,
which provide that states must specially
guard minors during an armed conflict and
respect the norms of international humanitarian law that protect them.
The Inter-American Court also considered Colombia’s violation of Article 22 of
the Convention (Freedom of Movement
and Residence). The first provision of
Article 22 states that “[e]very person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the
right to move about in it, and to reside in it
subject to the provisions of the law.”
According to the Inter-American Court,
Colombia violated Article 22 in three ways:
(1) by holding the Mapiripán residents as
hostages in their own homes while it carried
out the detentions, murders, and disappearances of the victims, (2) by forcing the
Mapiripán residents, in trying to escape the
violence created by the state, to abandon
their houses, belongings, lands, and relationships, and (3) by failing to guarantee
the necessary security conditions for the victims’ families so that they could safely
return to their property in Mapiripán.
Under Article 63 of the Convention,
which calls for the state to compensate the
injured party, the Inter-American Court recognized the rights of the victims’ families to
be indemnified by Colombia. The InterAmerican Court ordered Colombia to pay the
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victims’ families for the loss of their income,
as well as for their physical and emotional suffering. Noting the importance of identification of the victims’ bodies to the reparations
process, the Inter-American Court stated that
identified bodies should receive burials in
accordance with their families’ beliefs. The
Inter-American Court ordered that Colombia
publicly apologize for the massacre and recognize its international responsibility, guarantee
the protection of the former residents who
return to Mapiripán, install a monument that
commemorates the events of the massacre,
and educate the armed forces about human
rights and humanitarian law. Finally, the
Inter-American Court ordered Colombia to
investigate the acts, as well as to identify,
process, and sanction those responsible for
the massacre.
Setting a new precedent, the InterAmerican Court condemned Colombia’s
Law 975, the Law of Justice and Peace (Ley
de Justicia y Paz), which reincorporates
members of these armed groups and orders
them to contribute effectively to national
peace. As the victims’ representatives argued,
this law prevents the full disclosure of events
such as the Massacre of Mapiripán and
ignores the armed groups’ responsibility for
human rights violations. Finding this law
unacceptable, the Inter-American Court
reiterated that no domestic law can impede
the state from fulfilling its duty to investigate and sanction those responsible for
human rights violations. In particular, the
Inter-American Court declared that the state
cannot issue laws of amnesty for those who
may have committed grave human rights
violations. The Inter-American Court
expressed that the state’s responsibility to
investigate and sanction these violations is
crucial because it prevents impunity and
deters future acts of violence.
The Inter-American Court’s most recent
decision in Mapiripán will influence upcoming judicial decisions and state laws that
address impunity. It also represents the
Inter-American Court’s awareness that sentencing should not be controlled by superficial laws with appealing names, but rather
should operate as a means to punish human
rights violators and to enforce international
human rights and humanitarian law. Lastly,
Mapiripán is a timely reminder that the
Inter-American System’s law is controlling
over domestic laws and that its jurisdiction
over this and similar cases was granted
through the ratification of the Convention.
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AFRICAN COMMISSION
THE AFRICAN HUMAN Rights System
began to take shape under the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), which was founded in 1963. The African Union (AU)
replaced the OAU in July 2001, following
ratification of the AU’s Constitutive Act.
The African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (Charter), entered into force in 1986,
established the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights (Commission),
which is responsible for interpreting all provisions of the Charter. The Commission
meets twice annually to consider periodic
reports, as well as complaints brought
against State Parties to the Charter. At the
time of writing, the proposed African Court
on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR),
established in 2004 as a court to enforce the
Charter, was not yet operational (see below).

December 5, 2005, in Banjul, Gambia. The
Commission adopted a resolution on the
operationalization of an independent and
effective ACHPR and another on the renewal of the mandate and composition of the
ACPHR working group. It also adopted a
resolution acknowledging the entry into
force of the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa. The Commission
adopted further resolutions on the human
rights situations in the Darfur region of
Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Additionally, a resolution was passed on the
protection of human rights and the rule of
law while countering terrorism. It also passed
the “Resolution on Ending Impunity in
Africa and on the Domestication and
Implementation of the Rome statute of the
International Criminal Court.”

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS

Commissioners Mumba Malila, Reine
Alapini-Gansou, and Faith Pansy Tlakula
were nominated as Special Rapporteurs on
prisons and conditions of detention, human

The 38th Ordinary Session of the
Commission was held from November 21 -

rights defenders in Africa, and freedom of
expression
in
Africa,
respectively.
Additionally, the Commission adopted resolutions on the composition and operationalization of the Working Group on the Death
Penalty and on the composition and extension of the mandate of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations/Communities in
Africa. The 39th Ordinary Session of the
Commission will be held from May 9-23,
HRB
2006, in Banjul, Gambia.
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